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Abstract
In Stall v. State,1 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether prosecution under Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act,2 predicated upon violations of Florida’s
obscenity statute,3 violates the Florida constitutional right to privacy
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This article is a brief survey of substantive criminal law cases de-
cided by the Florida Supreme Court between December 1, 1989, and
December 1, 1990.
I. CRIMINAL OFFENSES: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
In Stall v. State,1 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether prosecution under Florida's Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization (RICO) Act,2 predicated upon violations of Florida's
obscenity statute,3 violates the Florida constitutional right to privacy.4
The court recognized that the right to privacy protects one's right to
possess obscene materials in the privacy of one's home.5 However, the
court found that the right to privacy does not extend to vendors of ob-
scene materials and held the obscenity and RICO statutes
constitutional. 6
The court also reviewed the constitutionality of Florida Statute
section 893.12(1)(e), which prohibits selling, purchasing, delivering,
etc., a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school.7 The statute
was attacked as being violative of the single-subject provision of the
Florida Constitution.8 The court held that the statute did not violate
* J.D., Stetson College of Law; practices with John D. Fernandez, P.A. in Clear-
water, Florida; adjunct professor at Stetson College of Law.
1. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990).
2. FLA. STAT. § 895.01-.06 (1985).
3. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1985). This statute is violated through the showing,
sale, distribution, and rental of obscene writings, tapes, and objects intended for ob-
scene purposes. Id.
4. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
5. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258.
7. Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990); see also Leonardi v. State, 567 So.
2d 408 (Fla. 1990); Bennett v. State, 559 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1990); Morrow v. State,
557 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1990); Lewis v. State, 556 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1990); Blankenship
v. State, 556 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1990); Dame v. State, 556 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1990).
8. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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this constitutional provision.9
II. SENTENCING
A. Length of Sentence
Florida Statute section 948.01(5) limits the duration of a sentence
of community control to two years.' However, where a defendant has
been convicted of separate crimes, the sentencing court may- impose
consecutive terms of community control even if the sentences are im-
posed at the same sentencing hearing."
Additionally, community control and probation may be stacked,
provided the total term does not exceed the recommended guidelines
range.' 2 Minimum mandatory sentences in capital felony cases may
also be stacked.' 3 Such consecutive sentences are permitted in homicide
cases as well as in other capital felony cases and even if the crimes
arise out of the same criminal episode.' 4
The supreme court also addressed the issue of whether or not im-
prisonment in the county jail may exceed one year if successive
sentences for various offenses are pending. 15 The court held that if the
sentences are imposed at the same time, the total time in the county
jail may not exceed one year. 16 However, if the defendant has previ-
ously been sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail, a subsequent
sentence may be imposed for additional county jail time up to one year,
even if the cumulative effect is that the defendant will be in the county
jail for over one year.17
B. Resentencing Upon Violation of Probation or Community
Control
When a defendant's probation is violated, upon resentencing, the
9. Burch, 558 So. 2d 1.
10. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(5) (Supp. 1988).
11. Crawford v. State, 567 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1990).
12. State v. Reed, 557 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1990); Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113
(Fla. 1990).
13. State v. Boatwright, 559 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1990); State v. Boyd, 558 So. 2d
1025 (Fla. 1990).
14. Boatwright, 559 So. 2d at 211.
15. Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1990).
16. Id. at 1163.
17. Id.
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defendant is entitled to gain time earned during his prior imprisonment
on the charge for which probation was revoked."' Accrued gain time
equals time spent in prison." A defendant sentenced as a youthful of-
fender whose probation is revoked is still entitled to the benefit of Flor-
ida Statute 958.14, which limits imprisonment to a maximum of six
years.20
III. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. In General
Since the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, sentencing courts
have been required to sentence all defendants convicted of a felony
committed after the effective date of July 1, 1985, within the recom-
mended guidelines range. Even where the statutory minimum or maxi-
mum sentences preclude sentencing within the guidelines, the court
must impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences if there are
multiple convictions in order to come as close as possible to the guide-
lines recommendation." The court must provide written reasons for de-
parture at the time the sentence is imposed or the sentence will be in-
validated.22 If the court does not provide written reasons, the reviewing
court must remand for resentencing within the guidelines with no possi-
bility of departure.2"
In determining the recommended range, prior convictions include
all convictions for crimes obtained prior to sentencing.24 The trial court
18. State v. Carter, 553 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1989).
19. Heuring v. State, 559 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990) (imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment for a specific term may not include probation for the time remaining
when the defendant is released early due to gain time or otherwise).
20. State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990). The court in Watts discussed the
1985 amendment to section 958.14, which limits the sentences of youthful offenders to
six years, and held that the amendment was applicable to all violations of probation
and community control occurring after the effective date of the amendment, even if the
original offense occurred prior to the amendment. See also State v. Kerklin, 566 So. 2d
513 (Fla. 1990); Cole v. State, 565 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1990); State v. Warren, 559 So.
2d 1139 (Fla. 1990); State v. Johnson, 559 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1990); State v. Dixon,
558 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1990); State v. Miles, 558 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1990); James v.
State, 558 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1990).
21. Branam v. State, 554 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1990).
22. Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
23. Robinson v. State, 571 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1990); Ferguson v. State, 566 So. 2d
255 (Fla. 1990); Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990).
24. Thorp v. State, 555 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1990).
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should also score juvenile furlough, attendance in juvenile programs,
and conditions of bail as legal constraint.2 5
B. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed va-
rious departure sentences. In State v. Vanhorn,26 an escalating pattern
of criminal conduct was sufficient to justify a upward departure, even
where the remaining reasons were invalid. However, in Herrin v.
State,217 the court found that substance abuse, coupled with reasonable
possibility of successful treatment, was a valid reason for a downward
departure.
In State v. Simpson,28 the court held that although defendant's
crimes were committed two days apart, it did not sustain a finding of
an escalating criminal pattern and sentence departure. The mere fact
the defendant committed a second offense while on probation, but was
not convicted therefor, was not sufficient for the court i'n Wesson v.
State to depart on the sentencing on the first offense. 9 The court in
Brown v. State"0 held a violation of a condition of bail an invalid reason
for departure. Additionally, in Wilson v. State31 the court held that an
abuse of a position of familial authority over the victim was not reason
to justify the imposition of departure sentence on convictions of lewd
and lascivious assault of child under sixteen years of age, even when
the child is mildly retarded.
IV. DEATH PENALTY
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed numerous death penalty
cases during the survey period. The court was again called upon to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors present in each case to
determine if the trial court properly imposed the most severe punish-
ment our law allows.
25. Brown v. State, 569 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1990); State v. Young. 561 So. 2d 583
(Fla. 1990); State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1990).
26. 561 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1990).
27. 568 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1990).
28. 554 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1989).
29. 559 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1990).
30. 569 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1990).
31. 567 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
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A. Constitutionality of Death Imposed in Florida's Electric
Chair
During the survey period, the supreme court reviewed the novel
issue of whether the death penalty was violative of the United States
and Florida Constitutions' prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment because of a malfunction in the electric chair.32 The issue
arose after the execution of Jesse Tafero on May 4, 1990. Flames and
smoke spurted from Tafero's head and emanated from the area of the
metallic skull cap.3 3 The state concluded, after an investigation, that
the use of a synthetic sponge in the skull cap caused the problem.3 4 The
court found that one malfunction is insufficient to justify additional in-
quiry and held the death penalty not to be cruel and unusual punish-
ment under these circumstances.35
B. Written Findings
To impose a sentence of death, the sentencing court must issue
written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors. 36 Merely
stating that "[t]he court has considered the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in evidence . . . and determines that sufficient aggravat-
ing circumstances exist, and there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances" does not comport
with the statute and is insufficient to justify a death sentence. 37 The
trial court d6es not have to expressly address each nonstatutory miti-
gating factor to sufficiently reject them.38 However, the written findings
must be sufficient so as to allow an opportunity for meaningful review
by the supreme court.39 If the written findings are insufficient, the
death penalty will be vacated and a life sentence imposed.40
32. Bertolotti v. State, 565 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1990); White v. State, 565 So. 2d
322 (Fla. 1990); Hamblen v. State, 565 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1990); Squires v. State, 565
So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1990); Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 19901.
33. Buenoano, 565 So. 2d at 310.
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id.; see also Bertolotti, 565 So. 2d at 1343; White, 565 So. 2d at 323; Ham-
blen, 565 So. 2d at 321; Squires, 565 So. 2d at 319.
36. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1989).
37. Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1990).
38. Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla. 1990).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Bouie, 559 So. 2d at 1115-16; FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1989).
Bell 1041
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C. Jury Recommendation of Life
During the survey period, the supreme court reviewed five cases
wherein the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation of life im-
prisonment.41 In all five cases, the supreme court vacated the death
sentence. In four of the cases, the supreme court remanded for imposi-
tion of a life sentence.42 In one case, the court remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during the
sentencing hearing.4"
D. Mitigating Factors
1. Statutory
Section 921.141(6) of the Florida Statutes sets out ".he statutory
mitigating factors to be considered in determining whether or not to
impose the death penalty.44 The defendant is entitled to an instruction
41. Cheshire v. State, 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (trial court failed to consider
emotional disturbance as mitigating factor and erred in finding aggravating factor of
heinous, atrocious or cruel where defendant shot his estranged wife); Carter v. State,
560 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1990) (statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors outweigh
evidence of five aggravating factors found by the trial court); Hallman ". State, 560 So.
2d 223 (Fla. 1990) (four of six aggravating factors found to be valid but insufficient to
outweigh the nonstatutory mitigating factors present); Heiney v. Dugger, 558 So. 2d
398 (Fla. 1990) (Hitchcock error found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, case
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing); Morris v. State, 557 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1990) (override of jury
recommendation of death penalty based on finding of single aggravatirg factor of hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel, insufficient to overcome the great weig It given jury's
recommendation).
42. See Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 913; Carter, 560 So. 2d at 1169; Hallman, 560
So. 2d at 228; Morris, 557 So. 2d at 30.
43. Heiney, 558 So. 2d at 400.
44. The mitigating factors include:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was ander the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or -zonsented
to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor,
(e) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
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regarding each factor for which evidence was adduced, unless the de-
fendant specifically waives such an instruction. 45 If the trial court fails
to appropriately instruct the jury, the reviewing court must determine
whether the failure to so instruct the jury affected the jury's recom-
mendation.46 If the court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
the failure had no effect on the jury's recommendation, a. new sentenc-
ing proceeding must be held.
2. Nonstatutory
The supreme court again reviewed Hitchcock violations. 8 Once
the court determines that there is a Hitchcock violation, it must apply
the harmless error doctrine to determine if reversible error occurred.49
Where the jury recommends life, there is no doubt that the error is
harmless. 50 Where the jury recommends death, the error could be prej-
udicial or harmless depending on the evidence of mitigating factors
presented during the penalty phase.5'
E. Aggravating Factors
Aggravating factors to be considered by the court are dictated by
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substan-
tially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1989).
45. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
46. Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
47. Id. at 421.
48. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (death sentence held invalid
where trial court failed to instruct jury that it may consider all mitigating circum-
stances in determining whether to recommend death). The trial court must allow the
consideration of nonstatutory as well as statutory mitigating circumstances to avoid a
Hitchcock violation.
49. See Copeland v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1990) (state conceded error
and record contained many items of potentially mitigating evidence and also was un-
clear as to whether trial court was aware that it could consider nonstatutory mitigating
factors); Smith v. State, 556 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990) (state conceded error but met
burden of proving harmless error where overwhelming body of aggravating factors
exist).
50. Heiney, 558 So. 2d 398.
51. Way v. Dugger, 568 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1990) (not harmless error where evi-
dence of numerous mitigating factors presented during penalty phase which the jury
should have considered); see also Copeland, 565 So. 2d 1348; Smith, 556 So. 2d 1096.
Bell 1043
7
Bell: Substantive Criminal Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
section 921.141(5) of the Florida Statutes.5 2 Once the jury makes its
recommendation, the trial court must weigh the aggravating factors
present before imposing sentence.
In the cases surveyed in this subsection, the jury recommended
death. The supreme court upheld the death sentence in fourteen cases.
The cases reviewed contained the following aggravating factors: prior
conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; 3 felony
committed for pecuniary gain;54 felony committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner; 5 felony committed while engaged in an
enumerated felony; 56 felony particularly heinous, atrocious, or cruel;51
felony committed to avoid lawful arrest;58 felony committed under sen-
52. Aggravating factors include:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual bat-
tery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throw-
ing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification.
() The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged
in the performance of his official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public
official engaged in the performance of his official duties if the motive for
the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim's official
capacity.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (1989).
53. § 921.141(5)(b).
54. § 921.141(5)(f).
55. § 921.141(5)(i).
56. § 921.141(5)(d).
57. § 921.141(5)(h).
58. § 921.141(5)(e).
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tence of imprisonment;59 defendant created a great risk of death to
many persons;6° and felony committed to disrupt a governmental
function. 6 '
59. § 921.141(5)(a).
60. § 921.141(5)(c).
61. § 921.141(5)(g); see Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (prior con-
viction of violent felony for a contemporaneous sexual battery and arson not upheld but
proper as to prior attempted robbery conviction; committed during commission of sex-
ual battery; heinous, atrocious, and cruel; cold, calculated, and premeditated not up-'
held - two mitigating factors insufficient to outweigh the valid aggravating factors);
Downs v. State, 572 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; commit-
ted for pecuniary gain; and cold, calculated, and premeditated not overcome by evi-
dence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d
908 (Fla. 1990) (heinous, atrocious, and cruel; committed during commission of sexual
battery - no mitigating factors found); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed during a burglary; and cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated supported by the record and death not disproportionate); Floyd
v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990) (committed for pecuniary gain and heinous,
atrocious, and cruel sufficient to justify death penalty); Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304
(Fla. 1990) (committed during commission of a felony; previous conviction of a violent
felony; and committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner not outweighed
by mitigating circumstances presented); Van Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.
1990) (committed while under sentence of imprisonment, committed to escape from
custody, created great risk of death to many persons and prior conviction of violent
felony sufficiently outweighed mitigating evidence to sustain sentence of death); Porter
v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed
during commission of burglary; cold, calculated, and premeditated; heinous, atrocious,
or cruel not upheld but the three valid aggravating factors sufficient to justify death
penalty); Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1990) (multiple murders - cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated apply to all and committed to disrupt governmental function
and committed for pecuniary gain applied to individual murders; additional aggravat-
ing factor present but not found by court is prior conviction of violent felony even
though the conviction contemporaneous with other convictions where multiple victims
or separate episodes involved); Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990) (prior
conviction of violent felony and committed for pecuniary gain outweighed nonstatutory
mitigating factors); Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990) (committed during
commission of sexual battery; committed to avoid lawful arrest; committed for pecuni-
ary gain; and heinous, atrocious, or cruel sufficient where no statutory mitigating fac-
tors found and only two nonstatutory mitigating factors present); Rivera v. State, 561
So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed during commis-
sion of enumerated felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; cold, calculated, and premedi-
tated not upheld-three remaining factors sufficient where only one statutory mitigat-
ing circumstance present and no nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Haliburton v.
State, 561 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1990) (under sentence of imprisonment; prior conviction of
violent felony; committed during commission of a burglary; and cold, calculated, and
premeditated sufficient to impose death where nonstatutory mitigating factors did not
Bell 1045
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The supreme court found the death penalty inappropriate in eight
of the cases included under this subsection. In doing so, the court found
in some of these cases that certain aggravating factors had not been
established by the evidence.62 Consistent with prior decisions, the court
also found that introduction of evidence of the defendant's lack of re-
morse is improper and requires resentencing.6" In other cases, the court
found the death penalty disproportionate under the particular circum-
stances of the case. 64
Once the supreme court vacates the death penalty, it may remand
for a new sentencing hearing or for imposition of a life sentence. The
supreme court remanded four of the above cases for a new sentencing
hearing and four for imposition of a life sentence.6 5
outweigh these aggravating factors); Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1990) (com-
mitted while engaged in commission of sexual battery; committed to avoid lawful ar-
rest; committed for pecuniary gain; and heinous, atrocious, or cruel sufficient even
where aggravating factors of prior conviction of felony of violence and cold, calculated,
and premeditated held invalid-total absence of mitigating circumstances).
62. Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (cold, calculated, and premed-
itated improperly found); Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) (trial court found
aggravating factors of committed for pecuniary gain and cold, calculated, and premedi-
tated; error to instruct jury as to heinous, atrocious, or cruel); Farinas v. State, 569 So.
2d 425 (Fla. 1990) (cold, calculated, and premeditated not present); Thompson v.
State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990) (single aggravating circumstance of cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated inapplicable where the heightened premeditation required to
support this finding not present); Preston v. State, 564 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1990) (prior
conviction of violent felony inapplicable where conviction vacated; cold, calculated, and
premeditated previously eliminated).
63. Colina v. State, 570 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1990).
64. Nibert v. State, 59 U.S.L.W. 3 (Fla. July 26, 1990) (one aggravating factor
and trial court failed to find mitigating circumstances where such evidence presented
and unrefuted); Farinas, 569 So. 2d 425; Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990)
(disproportionate in light of penalty imposed in factually similar cases -- killing result-
ing from ongoing domestic problems).
65. Nibert, 59 U.S.L.W. 3; Campbell, 571 So. 2d 415 (remanded for new sen-
tencing hearing); Colina, 570 So. 2d 929; Farinas, 569 So. 2d 425; Jones v. State, 569
So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990), Thompson, 565 So. 2d 1311 (remanded for imposition of life
sentence); Preston, 564 So. 2d 120; Blakely, 561 So. 2d 425.
1046 [Vol. 15
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/5
19911
Lastly, the supreme court approved an addition to the standard
jury instruction on the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 66 The addition defines the terms heinous, atrocious, and cruel.6
66. In re Florida Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.), 563 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1990).
67. Id.
('Heinous' means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. 'Atrocious' means
outrageously wicked and vile. 'Cruel' means designed to inflict a high de-
gree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering
of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious,
or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime
was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.)
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